" Now that foreign intercourse becomes daily more extensive, unless the government is directed from one central authority, the foundation of the state will fall to pieces. If, however, the old order of things be changed, and the administrative authority be restored to the Imperial Court, and if national deliberations be conducted on an extensive scale, and the Imperial decision be secured, and if the empire be supported by the efforts of the whole people, then the empire will be able to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of the earth - it is, I believe, my highest duty to realize this ideal by giving up entirely my rule over this land " (McLaren, "Japanese Government Documents," The Transactions of The Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 42 (1914), p. 2.)

Tokugawa Yoshinobu's gesture took the court by surprise and it was obliged to instruct the Bakufu to continue administering the country for the time being. Then, late in December 1867, Ookubo Toshimichi (1830-1878), a strong-minded retainer from Satsuma han, persuaded the group of radical court nobles that the emperor should be promptly restored. In addition to Ookubo's political associates from Satsuma, the effective ruler of Satsuma, Shimazu Hisamitsu (1817-1887), his counterpart in Tosa, Yamanouchi Toyoshige (1827-1872), and the chief minister of Tosa, Gotou Shoujirou (1838-1897) also knew of the plan, as did representatives of the han governments of Aki (Hiroshima Prefecture), Owari (Aichi Prefecture), and Echizen (Fukui Prefecture). More importantly, a large body of Choushuu troops and their fervently loyalist leaders were near Kyoto, poised to reenter the city from which they had been expelled a few years earlier in the course of the political and military skirmishing that preceded the Restoration.

The Boshin War
Matters came to a head in the early morning of 3 January 1868 when Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883), the most forceful of the radical court nobles, took charge of draft statement proclaiming an imperial Restoration which was to be read forthwith. Despite confusion at the palace gates, troops under the command of Saigou Takamori (1827-1877), a Satsuma samurai, secured the palace and the formal proclamation of the Restoration was heard by a small band of courtiers and daimyo. Yoshinobu's resignation as shogun was accepted for the second time, in his absence, and the high offices of the Bakufu abolished (including Shinsengumi). Still later in the day, the extremists prevailed once more. Intent on keeping the Tokugawa and their closest adherents out of any new system of government, they decided to demand the surrender of the former shogun's territories (the tenryou). These action, which terminated the Bakufu as an institution of national government, were taken by a handful of farsighted plotters with only very limited support; at this stage the Meiji seemed little more than a palace revolution.

Tokugawa Yoshinobu tended passively to accept the loyalists' actions. However, many of his vassals, esp in the northern provinces, did not give in so easily, and a War of The Restoration (Boshin War), which had begun near Kyoto (Toba-Fushimi) in January 1868, continued until the final surrender of Tokugawa forces in Hokkaido in June 1869. Despite the fighting, the new government was able to embark at once on an important restructuring of the country's administration, which included the removal of the emperor to Edo, now, renamed Tokyo, or the Eastern Capital. The great mass of the population, ninety percent or so, had little or nothing to do with the national Politics of the time. Surprisingly, the Kyoto court, under Meiji's father Emperor Koumei (1831-1866), was generally antipathetic to the idea of a Restoration and only a small minority of courtiers actively intrigued against the Bakufu. Ideologically, the Restoration was propelled neither by an upsurge of spontaneous loyalty to the imperial house, nor by a sudden revulsion of feeling against the Bakufu as an institution. Its main impetus before 1868 was NATIONALIST XENOPHOBIA, felt first by young samurai and spreading to politically minded landlord-entrepreneurs in the villages. This Sonnou Joui ("revere the emperor, expel the barbarian!") movement had been triggered by the unequal treaties, and the Bakufu came under increasingly severe attack for being unable to stand up to the foreigners.

The End of Tokugawa Regime
Resistance to foreign demands was clearly foolhardy, as nothing could prevent the bombardment from the sea of Edo and other coastal towns. However, the humiliation and cultural shock arising from the sudden breaching of the seclusion policy, and even more from one-sided nature of the treaties, exposed foreigners and Bakufu alike not only to verbal wrath but also to the physical hostility of the Sonnou Joui advocates. There were instances of murder, arson and open warfare, the most notorious being the 1862 killing of an Englishman, Richardson, by the samurai escort of the Satsuma daimyo on a highway just outside Yokohama, and the 1863 bombardment of foreign shipping in the straits of Shimonoseki by Choushuu batteries (cool ^_^). The diplomacy repercussions included huge indemnities and direct reprisals by the Powers against the offending han. But they were hardly less damaging than domestic consequences; and the nadir of Bakufu fortunes was reached when armies it raised to cow Choushuu in 1866 failed miserably, mainly through lack of zeal (Ee?! Doushitte? What an irritating...)

In order to placate domestic critics as well as strengthen their hand against foreign adversaries, the Edo authorities not unnaturally sought a national consensus in favor of either their decision to sign the treaties or a long-term policy of self-strengthening and ultimate opposition to the West. Consensus, however, implied consulting with the court and great daimyo, and treating them as relative equals in the making of decisions. This was something that had never happened before, and neither the courtiers nor the more assertive of the daimyo were slow to take advantage of a changed situation. The court, in fact, refused to confirm the treaties and at times argued for their abrogation. The Tokugawa government found itself caught between two conflicting sets of pressures, foreign and domestic, neither of which it could resist on its own over a period of time. The dilemma was cruel, and one from which there was to be no escape.

Makoto's endnote : How's that? Did you like the language? Heh...heh... Sorry if it's too elaborate. I just want to keep it as it was, my source book was such a heavy historical reading in advanced Australian-English. Hope it won't make you get puzzled ^_^, just open your dictionary if you find any difficult words, okay?!

Acknowledgments :
1. Mason, R. H. P. and J. G. Caiger. A History of Japan, Revised Edition: The Fourth Printing. Tuttle Publishing: Boston, Rutland, Vermont, Tokyo. 2001.
2. The Meiji Patriots, Ishin Shishi with their glorius rebellion and to the Bakufu warriors esp. Shinsengumi in their loving memory.